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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A REQUIREMENT
TO GIVE NOTICE BEFORE MARCHING
In Robinson v. Coopwood,' the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Mississippi recently considered the issue
whether it is constitutionally permissible to require civil rights demon-
strators to give to police one hour's notice before conducting a march
on the public streets of a small town. The plaintiffs there, six black
residents of Holly Springs, Mississippi, participated in a peaceful civil
rights march and were convicted in the city court of failing to give the
police one hour's notice before marching, as required by a Holly Springs
ordinance.2 The ordinance had been enacted five days before the
plaintiffs' march. The marchers brought suit to enjoin enforcement
of the ordinance on the ground that it unconstitutionally infringed on
their rights of free speech, expression, and assembly.
The district court held in Robinson that the notice requirement
"acts as an unconstitutional prior restraint upon the exercise of First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights." '  Quoting Terminiello v.
Chicago,4 the court further held that the notice requirement could not
be imposed unless the marchers' conduct was "shown likely to produce
a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far
above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." '
In reaching this result, the court found that the ordinance was
neither void for vagueness nor overly broad.6 The notice requirement
permitted no exercise of administrative discretion, but served solely to
1292 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Miss. 1968), aff'd per curiam, No. 27,275, 5th Cir.,
Oct. 22, 1969.
2The relevant section of the ordinance reads as follows:
SEcTION 1: Peaceful marching shall be permitted upon the public ways of
the City of Holly Springs, Mississippi, but subject to the following conditions,
regulations and exceptions:
(f) No march shall be conducted or permitted to proceed unless notice
to the police department of the said City shall have been given by participants
at least one hour prior to the beginning of the march. Such notice shall
identify the point of origin, the point of destination, the route to be taken
and the approximate number of participants in the march. Such notice shall
also apprise the police department whether upon arrival at the point of desti-
nation the march and related activity will be concluded or whether mass-
meetings, assemblages, demonstrations or related activities are planned to
occur at that place and time and if so, whether such activities will be con-
ducted upon any public property.
Id. at 935.
3Id. at 932.
4337 U.S. 1 (1949).
5292 F. Supp. at 933 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)
(emphasis added by district court)).
6292 F. Supp. at 931.
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inform the police of the time, size, and route of any impending march,
as well as of the activities planned at the march's terminus. However,
the court found further that enforcement of the ordinance had a "stifling
effect" on the demonstrators' rights of free speech and assembly,7 and
then surmised that the motive behind enforcement was to impede or halt
further demonstrations.' With these conclusions in mind, the court
weighed the city's interest in adequately controlling traffic and violence
against the plaintiffs' desire to conduct spontaneous marches free from
official restraint. The court found that, in the absence of anticipated
violence, the city's interest was wanting in the balance, and enjoined
enforcement of the ordinance. Although this analysis resembles a
balancing test, the court actually applied the stricter test of clear and
present danger.'0 By requiring the city to demonstrate the presence of
an imminent threat of violence, the court placed a heavier burden of
justification on Holly Springs, thus weighting the balance against the
city. Because Holly Springs could show no actual or anticipated
violence," the city's interest in controlling traffic and maintaining the
peace was clearly outweighed by the marchers' right of free expression.
In light of recent Supreme Court decisions involving communica-
tive marches,' the Robinson court's analysis and holding are novel and
surprising. This Comment examines the court's usage of the prior
restraint doctrine and the clear and present danger test to determine
whether such standards are appropriate for this case.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY FROM PRIOR RESTRAINT
The doctrine of immunity from prior restraint is a subsidiary
concept to the ideal of freedom of expression guaranteeed by the first
amendment. It embodies in particular the widespread and deep-felt dis-
taste for systems of licensing publications prevalent in America and
England in the seventeenth century.3 Licensing requirements were
7Id. at 930. The court cited no facts to support this finding.
8 The court stated, "It would seem that the city officials, in enacting, enforcing,
and prosecuting under this ordinance, were motivated primarily by a desire to impede
and, if possible, totally halt all organized civil rights marches within the corporate
limits." Id. at 934.
) The plaintiffs were convicted and filed appeals prior to seeking an injunction. Id.
at 929. The District court granted the injunction even though 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964)
provides that: "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
The Robinson court dismissed this statute as inapplicable because the Holly Springs
ordinance constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint. 292 F. Supp. at 934-35.
10 The test of clear and present danger actually is a balancing test. It forces the
state to produce weightier justifications for restrictions on speech and communicative
conduct.
1292 F. Supp. at 933.
12 E.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) ; Walker v. City of Birming-
ham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) ; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ; Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
'3 See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & ColTEMP. PROB. 648,
650-51 (1955).
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effective means of suppressing criticism of governments and officials
before the criticism could reach the public. 4 Thus prior restraints
limited one of the primary functions of free speech-peaceful protest
against government activities.
The United States Supreme Court first dealt significantly with the
doctrine of prior restraint in Near v. Minnesota."a Even at this initial
stage of the doctrine's development, the Supreme Court recognized that
the immunity from prior restraints on first amendment freedoms was
not absolute. However, Chief Justice Hughes carefully limited the
circumstances under which prior restraints might be allowed: "[T]he
protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But
3) 16the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases ....
Since Near, both the Court 17 and commentators 18 have recognized
other situations wherein prior restraints can be justified. For example,
prior restrictions on conducting parades '9 and exhibiting motion pic-
tures " have been upheld. Consequently, the doctrine is no longer as
rigid as Chief Justice Hughes first stated it. This desanctification has
resulted from the growing realization that a restraint is not necessarily
undesirable simply because it acts prior in time to the expression it re-
strains. As Paul Freund has stated,
[I]t will hardly do to place "prior restraint" in a special
category for condemnation. What is needed is a pragmatic
assessment of its operation in the particular circumstances.
The generalization that prior restraint is particularly ob-
noxious in civil liberties cases must yield to more particu-
laristic analysis.2
The opinion of Robinson v. Coopwood lacks this particularistic
analysis. The Robinson court stated that the Holly Springs notice
requirement and the discretionary enforcement of the parade statute
struck down by the Supreme Court in Cox v. Louisiana 22 both suffered
from the same constitutional defect-they were "impermissible prior re-
straint[s] on First Amendment freedoms." -  However, although the
restraint struck down in Cox did in fact act prior to any expression, the
Supreme Court rested its decision on wholly separate grounds.
14 Cf. id. 650-52.
15283 U.S. 697 (1931).
16Id. at 716. Among the exceptions are such extreme cases as military informa-
tion during -war, extreme obscenity, and seditious statements.
1T See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48-49 (1961);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
18 See, e.g., Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REv.
533, 537 (1951) ; Note, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 1001, 1005-06 (1949).
19 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
20 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
21 Freund, atpra note 18, at 539.
2379 U.S. 536 (1965).
23292 F. Supp. at 932.
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In Cox v. Louisiana, the appellant Cox led approximately 2,000
civil rights demonstrators in a march to the Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
courthouse to protest the arrest of a group of Negro college students.
The demonstrators assembled across the street from the courthouse and
displayed protest signs, sang songs, and prayed. Cox was convicted,
inter alia, of obstructing public passages under a state statute that
banned all obstructions save labor demonstrations. The Court found
that the Baton Rouge public authorities permitted some parades and
public meetings which in fact obstructed traffic, if the participants were
granted prior approval. The Court responded to this discriminatory
enforcement by reversing Cox's conviction on the ground that the
public officials exercised a broad power of censorship in violation of the
first and fourteenth amendments.
It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to deter-
mine which expressions of view will be permitted and which
will not . . . either by use of a statute providing a system
of broad discretionary licensing power or, as in this case, the
equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of an
extremely broad prohibitory statute.24
Although the Court did not explicitly condemn Baton Rouge's
system as a prior restraint, the discretionary enforcement acted essen-
tially as a prior restraint on demonstrations protected by the first amend-
ment. But the constitutional infirmity in Cox lay in the discriminatory
enforcement of the statute rather than in any prior restraining effect.Y
In fact, the Court very definitely indicated that certain prior restraints
upon first amendment freedoms would be permissible.
It is, of course, undisputed that appropriate, limited dis-
cretion, under properly drawn statutes or ordinances, concern-
ing the time, place, duration, or manner of use of the streets
for public assemblies may be vested in administrative officials.
provided that such limited discretion is "exercised with 'uni-
formity of method of treatment upon the facts of each applica-
tion, free from improper or inappropriate considerations and
from unfair discrimination' .... , 2'
The mere fact that the restraint in Cox operated prior to the
conduct regulated was insufficient to support a finding of unconstitu-
tionality; therefore, in Robinson, the fact that the notice requirement
was also a prior restraint should not make it unconstitutional. The
district court's equation of the nondiscretionary Holly Springs ordi-
24 379 U.S. at 557-58.
25 Mr. Justice Goldberg stated for the majority, "The situation is thus the same
as if the statute itself expressly provided that there could only be peaceful parades
or demonstrations in the unbridled discretion of the local officials." Id. at 557.2 1d. at 558 (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941)).
19691
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nance to the discretionary parade control system struck down in Cox
suggests an undiscerning "prior-therefore-prohibited" response to the
problem. Although the opinion is unclear whether this in fact was the
court's response, nevertheless, the court obviously felt that the notice
requirement could not stand in the absence of a showing by the city
of a clear and present danger of violence or breach of the peace.
II. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
The Robinson court cited several Supreme Court decisions that
required a showing by the state of a "clear and present danger" 27 or
"grave and immediate danger" 28 to justify restrictions on the right of
free expression, and then contrasted the peaceful nature of the Holly
Springs marches. Failing to find a clear and present danger of public
disorder, the court struck down the notice requirement. "[T]here is
no reason to require previous notice of an intention to conduct a
peaceful assembly when there is no public danger . . . reasonably
anticipated to result therefrom." 29
In reaching the conclusion that the city must demonstrate a clear
and present danger to sustain its notice provision, the court relied prin-
cipally upon Terminiello v. Chicago.3  In Terminello, the appellant de-
livered a speech severely attacking various political and racial groups,
thereby creating great unrest in the crowd assembled outside the
auditorium in which he was speaking. Terminello was convicted
under a breach of the peace statute which was construed in the trial
judge's charge as prohibiting any behavior that " 'stirs the public to
anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a
disturbance . . . ' " ' The Supreme Court reversed the conviction
on the ground that the first amendment protects speech that raises un-
popular ideas or "invites dispute."
In relying on Terminiello, the district court failed to make a
crucial distinction: Terininiello involved a statute construed to limit
the ideas one could express-the content of expression. The notice
provision in Robinson, however, regulated only the form of the
marchers' expression-the manner in which they expressed their ideas-
but not the content.32
27292 F. Supp. at 933 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
28Id. at 932 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539 (1945)).
29 292 F. Supp. at 932.
30 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
31 Id. at 4.
-2 This distinction between form and content is close to the distinction between
speech and conduct which is noted by the district court. 292 F. Supp. at 932. The
distinction between speech and conduct was noted by Justice Goldberg speaking for
the majority in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 555, but it is most closely associated
with Justice Black. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508 (1965)
(dissenting opinion) ; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 577 (concurring and dissenting
opinions) ; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 497-502 (1949).
Justice Black appears to base his speech-conduct dichotomy upon a literal interpre-
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It is essential to distinguish, where possible,33 regulation of the
content from regulation of the form of expression 4 in order to deter-
mine which test of constitutionality should be applied to the regulation.
The Supreme Court has required the state to show a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil which the state has a right to prevent 35
or has used similar danger language " only when dealing with state
attempts to regulate the content of expression.3 7  This limitation on the
clear and present danger test is derived from the original purpose of the
test-to expand the boundaries of permissible expression by distin-
guishing between the idea and the mode of expressing that idea."8 Thus
when the Court has considered attempts to regulate only the form or
manner of expression, it has discarded the clear and present danger
test3 9 and has resolved the constitutionality of the regulation under a
balancing test or similar formulation more receptive to state regula-
tion 4o than the clear and present danger standard.4' However, when
the regulation of form substantially limits the actor's ability to express
himself effectively, the Court, realizing that the freedom of expression
tation of the word "speech" in the first amendment. It is suggested here that the
form-content distinction is more meaningful for dealing with first amendment
problems. Since nearly all speech involves some type of conduct, the speech-conduct
distinction tends to become meaningless upon close analysis.
3-3 See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 917 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Emerson].
,34 See generally Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis,
52 CoLum. L. REv. 313, 314-18 (1952); Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-
Another Decade, 39 TEx. L. REv. 449, 450 (1961); 12 UTAH L. REv. 185, 186-88
(1967).
35 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919).
3 6See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539 (1945).
37 See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1962) (publication alleged
to be in contempt of court) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (registration
of labor union organizer prior to public speaking) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 261-63 (1941) (contempt of court) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52
(1919) (subversive literature).
The Court, while employing the clear and present danger test only in decisions
concerned with the regulation of the content of expression, has by no means been in
constant or unanimous agreement that the clear and present danger test is the proper
standard for judging state control of content. See Mendelson, Clear and Present
Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUA. L. REv. 313, 324-26 (1952) ; Mendelson,
Clear and Present Danger-Another Decade, 39 Tax. L. REv. 449, 455-56 &
nA6 (1961).
3 8 See Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52
COLUm. L. REv. 313, 316 (1952).
39 Cf. Emerson, supra note 33, at 911.
40 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ;
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 540 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Emerson, supra note 33, at 913.
41 Compare cases cited note 37 supra with Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-89
(1949) (sound truck); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (commercial
handbill combined with public protest); and Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
574 (1941) (parade permit).
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means little without "effective exercise of the right," 41 has added the
clear and present danger test to the balancing test.43
The shift to a more rigorous test of the constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance regulating expression when the regulation sub-
stantially controls content, reflects a realization that regulation of content
is more invidious than regulation of form. Regulation of the content
of expression would restrict or bar completely the dissemination of
particular ideas. On the other hand, reasonable regulation of the form
of expression would not censor ideas, but only channels their expression
into a form compatible with an ordered society." Further, by using a
more rigorous test only when regulation encroaches upon content,
courts recognize that a regulation of form frequently serves a valid
state interest which must be satisfied. Applying a test of content-the
clear and present danger test-to a regulation of form restricts too
greatly this state interest and can lead to absurd results. Consider, for
example, a ban on sound trucks in residential areas during the hours
of darkness.' Courts should not require a showing that the community
faces a clear and present danger of mental fatigue or breakdown before
permitting the city to regulate these trucks.
The Robinson court's failure to distinguish between form and con-
tent creates similar problems. A persual of the Holly Springs notice
requirement"4 reveals that, on its face, it is a regulation of the form
of expression, marching. It does not to any extent limit the ideas that
may be advanced by marching. Further, it does not limit the effective-
42 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940). See Mendelson, Clear and
Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUm. L. Rxv. 313, 317-18 (1952).
43 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), demonstrates the difficulty in draw-
ing a definite line between form and content of communicative conduct. In Thornhill,
petitioner was convicted undet a statute prohibiting loitering or picketing before any
business premises for the purpose of influencing the business activities of prospective
customers, employees, or business associates. The statute regulated the form of the
petitioner's expression-picketing. However, this regulation of form deprived peti-
tioner of one of his most effective means of publicizing labor grievances. Id. at 100.
Thus, the statute encroached upon the content of expression by prohibiting a form
of expression. The Supreme Court found the statute invalid on its face. The Court
stated,
The power and the duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the
peace and to protect the privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents
cannot be doubted. But no clear and present danger of destruction of life
or property . . . can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every per-
son who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of
a labor dispute . ...
Id. at 105. Where, as here, form merges into content to the extent that a limitation
on form substantially restricts the content of expression, danger language is employed
in testing the validity of the restriction. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36,
68-70 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). But see Emerson, supra note 33, at 939. See
generally Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52
CoLu . L. Rav. 313, 317-18 (1952).
44 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
45 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
46 The notice requirement is reproduced in note 2 supra.
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ness of the marchers' expression, but only requires that the police be
given prior notification of the time, size, and route of the march. 7
Nevertheless, as a result of the district court's decision, two legiti-
mate state interests, control of the streets and the prevention of dis-
orders, are compromised. In Cox v. New Hampshire,48 the Supreme
Court gave clear recognition to the legitimacy of the former interest.
There petitioners had been convicted under a state statute which pro-
hibited parades without a special license. In a unanimous decision up-
holding the constitutionality of the statute, the Court declared:
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply
the existence of an organized society maintaining public order
without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of
unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to im-
pose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience
of the people in the use of public highways has never been re-
garded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one
means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ulti-
mately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities
is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social
need.49
The Court in Cox did not require a showing of clear and present danger
to validate the New Hampshire parade license provision. That case
is not materially different from Robinson; it suggests that the Robinson
ordinance be held constitutional.
In addition, the district court's holding in Robinson undercuts en-
forcement of a pressing state interest in the prevention of disorders that
may result from marches. As a result of the decision, should the march
erupt into violence at some point along its route, the failure to notify
the police could result in an absence of law enforcement personnel at
the time and place they are needed most. 0
It is not asserted that recognition of the distinction between content
and form of expression will produce an automatic solution to all freedom
of expression problems. For one thing, it is not always possible to
47 A regulation, which, on its face, is a reasonable attempt to control the form
of expression, may become, through discriminatory enforcement, an impermissible
control of the content of expression by discouraging communicative conduct. For
example, if every Negro who obtains a march permit is subsequently subjected to
police harassment or private terrorism, Negroes willing to participate in spontaneous
demonstrations may refuse to give public notice of their intentions to march or refuse
to join scheduled marches. However, the problem here does not lie within the ordi-
nance but in the subsequent use of the marchers' notification. Cf. Cameron v. Johnson,
390 U.S. 611 (1968) ; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
48312 U.S. 569 (1941).
49 Id. at 574.
50 Holly Springs, a city of about 7300 persons, has 5 regular police officers.
Robinson v. Coopwood, 292 F. Supp. 926, 933 (N.D. Miss. 1968). An hour's notice
of an intent to march would enable the city police to either patrol the route of march
or summon auxiliary forces.
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categorize a regulation as one solely of content or of form. For example,
a statute that prohibited picketing to publicize labor disputes would
limit a form of expression, but it may also affect content of expression
because it would deprive laborers of one of their most effective methods
of publicizing grievances.5 However, the distinction between regula-
tion of content of expression and regulation of form of expression has
a valid basis in our society's varying interests in limiting the effects of
these two types of regulation. When the distinction is clear, as it is in
Robinson, it is unnecessary and unprecedented to require a showing of
clear and present danger to justify a regulation of the form of expression.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The district court's use of the doctrine of prior restraint and the
clear and present danger test to judge the constitutionality of an ordi-
nance regulating the form of expression was a misapplication of first
amendment doctrines and did not provide a satisfactory solution to the
problem presented in Robinson. A more reasoned approach should
determine first, whether the ordinance on its face authorized adminis-
trative discretion or was discriminatorily enforced, in either case per-
mitting censorship of the content of expression; and second, whether
the ordinance was overbroad.
On its face, the Holly Springs notice provision does not permit
administrative discretion.' In fact, the ordinance was copied wholly
from an injunction previously issued by the court.53 As soon as the
requisite notice is given, that provision of the ordinance is automatically
satisfied. There is also insufficient evidence to establish a pattern of
selective enforcement of the ordinance. Passage of the ordinance only
five days prior to the plaintiffs' arrests nearly precludes such a finding. 4
There is no indication that other marches were allowed to proceed even
though the provisions of the ordinance had not been complied with. 5
51 Note 43 supra.
52 292 F. Supp. at 931.
53 Id, at 934.
54 Id. at 928-29.
55 Perhaps the reason which the district court explicitly advanced for finding the
notice provision unconstitutional-that the city had failed to demonstrate a clear and
present danger or an imminent threat of violence-was not the primary motivation
for its result. Near the end of its opinion the court stated:
It would seem that the city officials, in enacting, enforcing, and prosecuting
under this ordinance, were motivated primarily by a desire to impede and, if
possible, totally halt all organized civil rights marches within the corporate
limits.
292 F. Supp. at 934.
A good argument can be made that the motive of the Holly Springs officials was
precisely the one that the court suggested. But what significance should be given to a
bad motive where the statute is otherwise constitutional is not clear. The Supreme
Court declared in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) :
It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not




To determine whether the ordinance is overbroad, the court must
identify precisely those interests that will be advanced by the regulation
and those interests that will suffer from its enforcement.50 Here, if the
notice provision is permitted to stand, the marchers' ability to engage
in completely spontaneous marches and their feeling of freedom from
official restraint will suffer to some degree1 7  On the other hand, if
the notice provision is upheld, the city will have sufficient time to
assemble an adequate number of police officers to handle any traffic
problems that might develop and to deter violence that might arise be-
tween marchers and spectators."5
With the interests at stake identified, a choice must be made to
determine which shall prevail. In making this choice, the court should
consider the distinction between a regulation of the form of expression
and the more invidious regulation of the content of expression. If the
regulation is one of form, the state should not have as heavy a burden
of justifying the regulation as the clear and present danger test re-
quires; rather, the balancing test should be used. But even with recog-
nition of this distinction, there is no mechanical scale to weigh the
conflicting interests; the search for a metaphysical phrase which will
generate an automatic solution to the problem only diverts attention
from making the choice between the conflicting interests. The decision
rests inescapably upon a human judgment of the more desirable
alternative.
On the basis of this analysis, the notice requirement ought to stand.
A fairly administered notice provision restricts only slightly the form
of the marchers' expression without affecting in any way the content,
and by insuring adequate police presence to prevent violence, adds to the
probability that marches will accomplish a peaceful, public airing of
grievances.
But in the same term the Court held an Arkansas statute unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of the freedom of religion since
Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which
it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular
religious doctrine ....
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968).
If the motive of the Holly Springs aldermen who enacted the ordinance was
the primary concern of the district court, it should have dealt directly with this
question, and not borrowed the clear and present danger test to declare the ordinance
unconstitutional.
66See Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 1091, 1120 & n.158 (1968).
47 292 F. Supp. at 934.
58 Note 50 supra.
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